We present you the fifty-third instalment of the information service bringing interesting facts from the world of competition law. This time we share with you a selection of events for April and May 2025 that caught our attention.
As in previous posts, we faced the difficult task of selecting the most interesting cases for you from a large number of cases. In the end, we decided to focus on anticompetitive agreements, in particular those that the Czech Competition Authority deals with most frequently: agreements on resale price maintenance in distribution relationships and agreements on coordinated participation in public procurement (bid rigging). To this we have added three interesting and very long-lasting cartels in the automotive and pharmaceutical sectors, as well as Advocate General Emiliou’s approach on the application of competition law to sports associations.
Resale price maintenance
Prosecuting resale pricing is a regular part of the Czech Competition Authority’s work, and April was no different (and continues to be). For this reason, while we disagree with the Czech Competition Authority’s approach in this area, we regularly advise our clients to review their pricing policies towards distributors and resellers/retailers.
In April, the Czech Competition Authority imposed a fine of CZK 2.77 million to Miroslav Weber, a pet food distributor, for setting retail prices. Weber had been setting minimum retail prices for his dealers since at least the beginning of 2019 and enforcing them through monitoring and sanctions. In determining the amount of the fine, the Czech Competition Authority took into account Weber’s relatively small market power, limited impact on consumers, and active cooperation – including ending this conduct, informing resellers of their freedom to set prices, and implementing a competition compliance program. Finally, a settlement also contributed to the reduction of the fine. This is the seventh resale price maintenance case in the pet food industry in the last three years.
Furthermore, the Czech Competition Authority announced in April that it conducted a local investigation of a producer of games and paper goods on suspicion of resale price maintenance.
The Greek Competition Authority fined ATLANTA EUR 127,314 for having participated in the resale price maintenance on the market for cereals intended for direct consumption. The infringement, which took place between March and August 2021, involved ATLANTA enforcing fixed retail prices through agreements with supermarkets, to which they largely adhered. The case was resolved in a settlement which resulted in a reduction of ATLANTA’s fine.
In May, the German Competition Authority fined Sennheiser and Sonova nearly EUR 6 million for participating in resale price maintenance for premium headphones sold under the Sennheiser brand. From at least 2015 until September 2022, Sennheiser – and later, after the takeover of the company in 2022, Sonova – coordinated fixed retail prices with authorised dealers in Germany, monitored prices and pressured dealers to increase them if they fell below the recommended level. Although Sennheiser employees received antitrust training, they used coded language to conceal this conduct. The companies cooperated in the investigation, which led to a settlement and reduced fines.
Cartels in public procurement (bid rigging)
Competition authorities pay great attention to the coordination of participation in public procurement. The reason is that contracts are often overpriced, leading to higher public expenditure. Furthermore, the Czech Competition Authority regularly informs contracting authorities whose contracts have been subject to coordination of their right to compensation and offers its support in this respect. It is therefore necessary to avoid such situations and to introduce an internal competition compliance policy. Incidentally, we informed you about another risk associated with bid rigging agreements (sanctions in the form of a ban on the performance of public contracts) in our previous post.
The Slovak Competition Authority fined five competitors a total of EUR 360,000 for a cartel related to a public procurement in the field of robotics. In addition to the four bidders who coordinated their bids, the Slovak Competition Authority also punished the contracting authority itself for deliberately manipulating the tender procedure. (Incidentally, the Czech Competition Authority also wants to punish the contracting authorities for bid rigging if it participates in it.) Three entities, including the contracting authority, were banned from participating in public procurement for three years. One competitor was banned by the Slovak Competition Authority for only one year after pleading guilty to participating in the cartel. Another was completely exempted from this penalty thanks to cooperation and the provision of evidence under the leniency programme.
In May, the German Competition Authority fined seven road repair companies a total of EUR 10.5 million for coordinating their participation in tenders between 2016 and 2019. The companies colluded on contract winners and submitted coordinated cover bids in several German federal states. In some cases, districts were divided between the companies using maps and contacts were disguised as legitimate business communications. Bitunova GmbH was fined less by the Competition Authority under the leniency programmes. All companies then agreed to settle. In view of the fact that bid rigging is a criminal offence in Germany, law enforcement authorities were involved in the case.
Recycling cartel
In April, the European Commission (EC) fined 15 major car manufacturers and the European Automobile Manufacturers Association (ACEA) a total of EUR 458 million for participating in a 15-year cartel on end-of-life vehicle (ELV) recycling. The manufacturers agreed not to pay dismantlers and not to advertise how much of ELVs or new vehicles are recyclable or contain recycled materials, thereby misleading consumers. Mercedes-Benz avoided a fine by reporting the cartel to the EC, while other manufacturers, including Volkswagen, Renault-Nissan and Ford, admitted their involvement and agreed to settlements. This case is even more interesting as it represents the largest settlement case in the history of the EC and was coordinated with the UK Competition Authority.
Drug cartels
In April, the Belgian Competition Authority fined pharmaceutical companies Johnson & Johnson Consumer, Boehringer Ingelheim and Haleon a total of more than EUR 11.2 million for colluding on an anti-competitive category management system for 15 years. The companies jointly controlled the placement of OTC medicines in selected Belgian pharmacies, favouring their own products and excluding competitors through the design and implementation of planograms. All companies admitted their involvement and entered into a settlement agreement with the Competition Authority, which resulted in a 10 % reduction of their fine.
In April, the Swiss competition authority also fined six pharmaceutical companies ( Boehringer Ingelheim, Alkaloids of Australia, Alkaloids Corporation, Alchem, C2 PHARMA, Linnea und Transo-Pharm ) approximately CHF 600,000 (approx. EUR 636,600) for colluding on price fixing and quota allocation for the drug substance butylscopolamine bromide (SNBB) between 2005 and 2019. Under the leniency programme, the Competition Authority fully immunised C2 PHARMA for revealing the cartel, while two other, Transo-Pharm and Linnea, had their fines reduced for providing further evidence. The EC had previously imposed a fine (in 2023) total of EUR 13.4 million for this cartel.
Sports Associations
Sports associations and competition law were dealt with by Advocate General Nicholas Emiliou in May. He argued that while sports associations have autonomy, their self-regulation is limited if it significantly affects areas governed by EU law, such as competition, free movement and data protection. In three football-related cases (RRC Sports, ROGON and Tondela), he stressed that EU rules apply to economic activities – including in sport – and that exemptions only apply if the effects on the internal market are minimal. Sports exemptions should be interpreted very narrowly.
The Advocate General stated, inter alia, that regulations affecting entities such as football agents (RRC Sports) are generally permitted, but must be justified if they have appreciable anti-competitive effects. Such justifications must meet EU standards of legitimacy, proportionality and effectiveness.
It also held that the no-poach agreement concluded by Portuguese football clubs during the COVID-19 pandemic (Tondela), which was aimed at preventing the recruitment of players who had unilaterally terminated their contracts, should not automatically be regarded as anti-competitive if its real purpose was to preserve the fairness and integrity of the competition.
