We present you the fifty-second instalment of the information service bringing interesting facts from the world of competition law. This time we share with you a selection of events from January to March 2025 that caught our attention.
The activities of the competition authorities in the first quarter of 2025 were varied, so we have focused on cases that illustrate a certain trend in their activities: competition authorities are increasingly dealing with non-poach and remuneration agreements between undertakings (not necessarily direct competitors). They also continue to be interested in the activities of business associations and the resale price maintenance by manufacturers/distributors. The activities of digital platforms continue to be investigated under the head of abuse of dominance, even though the DMA has been in operation for more than a year. Importantly, the ban on public procurement as a sanction for prohibited agreements in procurement procedures has returned to the scene in the Czech Republic.
Agreements in the labour markets
The fight against agreements affecting competition in labour markets is slowly but surely becoming part of the competition authorities‘ repertoire. At least that is how it looks from the perspective of the first quarter of 2025.
In February, the Portuguese competition authority fined Inetum EUR 3 million for entering into an agreement with three other digital services companies that distorted competition in the labour market. The companies agreed not to approach or recruit employees, in particular technology consultants, from the other companies involved in the agreement. According to the competition authority, this split the labour market and restricted labour mobility. The other three companies were previously fined by the Portuguese competition authority, on the basis of a settlement agreement. Only Inetum did not admit to the alleged infringement, which is why the authority has only now closed the case.
In , the UK competition authority fined BT Group, IMG Media, ITV and the BBC EUR 4.2 million for sharing information on the remuneration of freelancers, including daily rates and pay rises. Sky UK was also involved in the exchange of information. However, it avoided the fine by informing the competition authority of the agreement – by applying for leniency. The media companies in question often use freelancers to produce and broadcast sports content (especially during major football and rugby matches). In order to avoid price wars, they harmonised and compared their rates for freelance work.
Other agreements between competitors
At the beginning of January, the Czech competition authority imposed only the second ever ban on the performance of public contracts, which can be a sanction in the case of cartels related to public contracts (bid rigging). The low number of cases so far is due to the fact that until July 2023 competitors can avoid the ban either by successfully applying for leniency or by agreeing to a settlement. From 2023 onwards, only leniency applicants will be able to avoid the ban. In the case of a settlement, the maximum duration of the ban will only be reduced to a maximum of one year. The Czech competition authority expects this change to increase the number of leniency applications.
For bid rigging, the Czech competition authority imposed a fine on Finezza facility and REK SYSTEM - both in the amount of CZK 1.068 million. This represented approximately 10% of the value of the contract to which the agreement related. The aim of the agreement was to ensure that the contract was awarded to Finezza facility. The possibility of coordination was brought to the attention of the competition authority directly by the contracting authority. In addition to the fine, the competition authority imposed a ban on Finezza Facility (the published report does not specify for how long). It did not impose a ban on REK SYSTEM because, after assessing its economic and financial situation, it concluded that the simultaneous imposition of a fine and a ban on the performance of contracts would lead to the liquidation of the company.
During the first quarter, the competition authorities also dealt with the activities of business associations, which shows that they continue to take a close interest in them. The competition authorities, including the Czech competition authority, often have the power to sanction not only the association itself but also its members. At the same time, the members act as guarantors for the payment of a fine, the maximum amount of which is based on the total turnover of the members.
As part of its competition advocacy, the Czech Dairy Association was warned by the Czech competition authority that its price signalling may constitute a prohibited price cartel. In an article for the daily Právo, the chairman of this union stated that a quart of butter should not cost less than CZK 60 and that lower prices distort the market.
The Belgian competition authority has accepted the commitments proposed by Belgapom, an association of potato processors and traders. The association published a weekly price index (notation) reflecting the most commonly used purchase prices for potatoes. The competition authority recognised that the notation reduces the uncertainty arising from the volatility of potato prices for both growers and processors. It also compensates for the lack of transparency and information asymmetry in the physical potato market. On the other hand, it increases the transparency of processors’ purchasing strategies and allows them to coordinate their purchase prices. On the basis of these considerations, the competition authority ultimately accepted Belgapom’s commitments to collect and make available purchase price information in an aggregated and anonymised form via a digital platform.
The Danish Competition Authority then dealt with the case of Botex, an association of independent retailers specialising in home textiles, which for at least twelve years had restricted the freedom of its members to advertise in geographical areas where another member of the association operated. Although there was a joint purchasing agreement between the members of Botex and their stores operated under the same brand, this did not, the competition authority considered that this did not alter the fact that they remained competitors. The competition authority ordered the members of Botex to cease the conduct and brought an action for a fine before the Court.
Prohibited distribution agreements
The competition authorities continued to crack down on resale price maintenance in 2025. In the first quarter, they targeted pet food distributors, among others.
In January, the Polish competition authority fined Empire Brands PLN 352,821 (approx. EUR 82,656) and its two managers PLN 82,250 (approx. EUR 19,268) and PLN 39,000 (approx. EUR 9,136 ) for setting minimum prices in the online sale of pet food. Empire Brands also monitored compliance with these prices.
In March, the Czech competition authority imposed a fine of CZK 3.5 million on Hájek Pet Food for setting retail prices for dog and cat food and prohibiting the sale of these products at lower prices. The company monitored retailers’ compliance with the set prices and enforced price increases under threat of sanctions.
The Dutch competition authority has not yet opened proceedings, but has only issued warnings to nine dog food companies for allegedly influencing the sales prices of their products sold in specialist shops, thereby keeping prices artificially high. The resale price maintenance took place both directly and through wholesalers. The competition authority is now monitoring whether dog food suppliers are complying with its warnings. According to the authority, the pet food market is susceptible to resale price maintenance because dog owners want the best for their pets and are willing to pay a higher price for it.
In March, the Czech competition authority also published its first information sheet of the year, this time on vertical agreements, focusing on resale price maintenance. Among other things, the Czech competition authority explicitly states that resale price maintenance can have a positive effect on competition. However, the burden of proof lies with the supplier. At the same time, it gives four examples where positive effects may occur: (i) introduction of a new product (incentive for sellers to better reflect the manufacturer's interest in promoting the product); (ii) organisation of a coordinated low-price campaign (two to six weeks); (iii) avoidance of damage to the product's reputation (avoidance of a situation where the seller deliberately sells the product at a loss, which could lead to a reduction in the overall demand for the product); and (iv) provision of additional pre-sales services for (especially) complex products (ensuring a sufficient margin for sellers as an incentive to invest in providing quality pre-sales services).
It is encouraging that the Czech competition authority recognises that there are pro-competitive resale price effects. In so doing, it has committed itself to recognising these pro-competitive effects. As soon as a supplier argues for the benefits of resale pricing, we will see how serious the Czech competition authority was about this change.
However, competition problems in distribution agreements do not only arise in relation to resale prices. They can also arise, for example, in the context of exclusive distribution agreements.
Beevers Kaas entered into an agreement with Dutch cheese producer Cono for the exclusive distribution of Beemster cheese in Belgium and Luxembourg. At the same time, however, Cono supplied Beemster cheese in the Netherlands to the retailer Ahold Delhaize, which also had supermarkets in Belgium and sold Beemster cheese there. Beevers Kaas argued that, under the competition rules on exclusive distribution, Cono's exclusive territories should protect it from active sales by other retailers and sought to do so in court. The dispute went all the way to the Court of Justice. In January, Advocate General Medina gave her opinion on the case. According to her, a manufacturer/supplier is only obliged to protect an exclusive distributor against supplies from its other distributors if the exclusive distribution agreements actually encourage the exclusive distributor to invest in its sales activities in the exclusive territory. Moreover, according to Advocate General Medina, this condition is only fulfilled if the other distributors expressly or tacitly accept the prohibition on active sales in the exclusive territory.
Abuse of dominance by digital platforms
The first quarter also saw several losses at BigTech companies. Of interest were two cases dealt with by national competition authorities concerning Google and Apple operating systems as platforms for third party applications.
In the case of the Android Auto platform, the Court of Justice held that the refusal of a dominant competitor (Google) to allow interoperability of its platform with another competitor's application, which would make access to the platform more attractive, may constitute an abuse of a dominant position. In the present case, Google refused to integrate Enel X Italia's JuicePass application into its Android Auto car system. Enel X Italia operates 60 % of all electric vehicle charging stations in Italy. In 2018, it launched the aforementioned JuicePass app, which allows drivers to find and book charging stations. However, Google has refused to take any steps to make the app work with Android Auto, which would allow drivers to view the app on the on-board screen. For this, the Italian competition authority fined Google EUR 102 million. Google challenged the fine in court, which referred a preliminary ruling to the Court of Justice. The Court of Justice based its decision on the fact that abuse can occur even if the platform is not necessary for the business of the competitor seeking to access it. This may be the case the platform has been developed to enable third parties to use it and its use increases the attractiveness of the products offered by those third parties.
At the end of March, the French competition authority fined Apple EUR 150 million for excessive rules on the distribution of mobile apps iOS and iPadOS. The abuse concerned Apple’s framework for tracking users through apps (App Tracking Transparency), which the competition authority found too strict. The framework consists of pop-ups that ask users to consent to tracking when using an app. According to the authority, the objective of this system (protection of users' personal data) is not in itself problematic. However, the way in which it is implemented is problematic, as it is neither necessary nor proportionate to its objective. In the view of the Competition Authority, it causes clear economic damage to app publishers and advertising service providers. It also undermines the neutrality of the framework by discriminating against smaller publishers who, unlike large vertically integrated platforms such as Apple, rely heavily on third-party data collection to fund their business.
